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The typical requisites for receiving testimony from an expert
witness are that the expert be qualified in a particular subject or area of
expertise, that the expert testify in opinion form or otherwise, which
will help the fact finder, and that there be a proper basis for the expert's
testimony. This article examines the changing meaning in the law of
evidence of the expert's subject area in cases involving children.
During most of the last century, where the expert witness proposed to
testify concerning a new or novel scientific system, process or
technique, the court applied the rule of Frye v. U.S. I to determine the
reliability of the subject matter. The Frye test requires the court to
determine whether the new scientific process is generally accepted in
the scientific community to which it belongs.2 In other cases involving
experts, the courts have been left to determine, in the exercise of
discretion, whether they feel comfortable putting a particular subject in
front of the jury or admitting the evidence in a bench case. Since most
experts do not testify about evidence derived from a novel scientific
system or technique, the courts in most cases have applied the
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Senior Judge, St. Joseph Probate Court
(Indiana).
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Id. at 1014.
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traditional rules, which apply to expert witness testimony. 3 As a rule,
most of the new or novel "scientific evidence" was derived from the
physical or hard sciences. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,4 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules
of Evidence and not Frye determine the admissibility of scientific
evidence in the federal district courts.5 Under Daubert, the court must
make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasons (principles) or
methods (techniques) are scientifically valid (reliable) and can be
properly applied to the facts of the case. 6 Daubert provided a list of
preliminary considerations for the trial court judge to use in deciding
whether to admit the evidence. 7  The Supreme Court clarified its
Daubert decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,8 by extending the
Daubert analytical framework and list of factors beyond scientific
knowledge to cases involving technical or other specialized
knowledge.9 Thus, Kumho directs the federal district court to consider
the Daubert factors, and others as necessary, with every expert
witness.10 While the federal law is developing along the lines of
Daubert and Kumho, the states are taking various approaches to expert
testimony. Some jurisdictions continue to adhere to the Frye rule,
others have embraced Daubert but not Kumho, some states have
adopted both Daubert and Kumho, and other state jurisdictions have
developed their own tests with respect to scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge described by experts. This article analyzes
these various approaches, with special emphasis upon the proliferation
of non-traditional, soft psychological evidence, which frequently is at
the center of cases involving children.
RELIABILITY - THE LAW'S MAIN HISTORICAL CONCERN WITH NEW OR
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
In the interest of a fair trial to all of the parties, the court's initial
concern when an expert witness is called to testify is whether the
3. See Fed. R. Evid. 702-706 (2004).
4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 580.
7. Id. at 593-594.
8. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 138.
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subject matter is reliable enough to put in front of the fact finder. This
matter is of particular importance in jury trials, where the court is
concerned about the risk that the jury may regard scientific evidence
with a mystic aura of infallibility.'1  To the extent that the court is
concerned about the reliability of a novel scientific technique, a hearing
is required to determine the reliability of the evidence. Often, the court
feels comfortable putting the subject in front of the jury and denies the
opponent's motion for a hearing to determine reliability. Courts over
the years have made these reliability determinations on an ad hoc basis
with little guidance as to what is new or novel and what is "scientific
evidence," and there is little consistency from one jurisdiction to
another as to the answers to these questions. For example, the
following are subjects which courts have determined are appropriate
for expert witness testimony without a hearing to determine reliability
(pursuant to Frye or Daubert): testimony of qualified experts as to why
a child would cooperate with an adult who had been sexually abusing
the child; 12 use of a colposcope to diagnose sexual abuse; 13 "DNA
fingerprinting" to determine paternity in an adoption case; 14 podiatrist
testimony linking the accused to shoes; 15 eyewitness identification;
16
confusional arousal syndrome; 17 dog sniff evidence; 18 facilitated
communication used by a child welfare agency to assist an autistic
child to testify; 19 anatomically correct dolls; 0 probability extrapolation
to determine the amount of cocaine contained in bricks too numerous
to individually analyze;2 1 forensic document examination (more "skill"
than "science," therefore it does not have to meet the Daubert
criteria); 22 dog tracking evidence; 23 statistics-based models; 24 and
11. See People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 367-368 (1984), overruled, People v.
Mendoza, 23 Cal. 4th 896 (2000).
12. State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (N.C. App. 1988).
13. People v. Mendibles, 199 Cal. App. 1277, 1295 (2d Dist. 1988).
14. In re Baby Girl S., 523 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637 (1988).
15. State v. Hasan, 534 A.2d 877, 881 (Conn. 1987).
16. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 376.
17. People v. Cegers, 7 Cal. App. 4th 988, 1000-1001 (4th Dist. 1992).
18. People v. Sommer, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 174 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 1993).
19. See In re Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (1993); State v. Warden, 891 P.2d
1074, 1093-1094 (Kan. 1995).
20. People v. Giles, 635 N.E.2d 969, 977 (Ill. App. 1994).
21. People v. Peneda, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1022, 1030 (4th Dist. 1995).
22. US. v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) [a pre-Kumho
decision].
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dissociative amnesia.
25
When the courts have found it necessary to determine the
reliability of new or novel scientific evidence (or just "scientific
evidence") they have focused on two separate reliability determinations
- the reliability of the underlying theory or principle involved and the
reliability of the technique which is used to apply the principle. Some
courts have blended the two concepts together and simply require a
determination of "reliability of the scientific evidence." Where the
evidence involves new or novel science, the court will usually conduct
a separate hearing on the reliability of the evidence before the expert
testifies. With respect to the underlying theory or principle of hard
science, the courts have traditionally looked at whether the theory is
supported by a scientific basis in the laws of nature. Similarly, with
respect to determining the reliability of the scientific technique, the
court must be satisfied that the system used is scientifically valid.
Courts have made these reliability determinations (or simply one
determination of scientific validity) either by considering expert
witness testimony2 6 or, in some situations, where the court is satisfied
that formal proof is not required, through the doctrine of judicial
notice. 27 Once the court determines that the underlying principle and
technique are reliable, it is further necessary for the court to insure that
the technique was properly applied in the particular case.
28
TESTS TO DETERMINE RELIABILITY OF "SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE"
THE FRYE RULE
The determination by the courts of the reliability of scientific
evidence during much of the last century was dominated by the Frye
rule, wherein the trial court looks to members of the relevant scientific
community to help the court determine whether the theory or technique
upon which the evidence is based is generally accepted in the scientific
community. The Frye rule, with its deference to scientific expert
witnesses, often results in reduced discretion for the trial court judge,
23. Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Colo. 1999).
24. State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. App. 2001).
25. Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 118, 134 (Ariz. 2000).
26. See e.g. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-769 (Minn. 1980).
27. See e.g. People v. Thomas, 561 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. 1990).
28. See e.g. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
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who often resorts to simply "counting noses" of experts in making
findings on reliability. Most courts have held that the Frye test applies
only to scientific evidence that relies on novel theories or technology.
29
In addition to the novelty requirement of Frye, some courts have held
that the general acceptance standard should be applied only to evidence
"based on or derivative of hard science," 3° leaving psychological
evidence to be treated by application of traditional rules pertaining to
experts. More recently, however, courts that follow the Frye rule have
expanded its application to the behavioral or "soft" sciences.
Under the Frye rule, there are many issues that have troubled
courts and scholars. For example, what is the relevant scientific
community? How many individuals make up the scientific
community? Some courts have held that one person cannot comprise a
scientific community. 3 1 What evidence or testimony may be used to
establish general acceptance? Several courts have held that a
technician is not a scientist and therefore cannot speak for the scientific
community. 32  Assuming the court has identified a scientific
community, what percentage of the community is required to constitute
general acceptance? Some courts have held that scientific evidence
will be deemed generally accepted if it commands approval of a clear
majority of the scientists in the field.33
Jurisdictions that have adhered to the Frye rule (even after
Daubert) argue that the benefits of Frye outweigh its disadvantages.
34
The arguments begin with the proposition "that before the results of a
Scientific process can be used against [a litigant, that person should be]
entitled to a Scientific judgment on the reliability of [the] process."
35
This argument is particularly strong when made by a defendant in a
criminal case as a matter of due process. It is further argued that the
Frye rule puts the issue of reliability of scientific evidence in the hands
of scientists, where it belongs. This assessment by the scientific
community produces uniformity of decision, which is a valued policy
in the law. It is also contended that the Frye rule protects both sides by
29. See e.g. Brooks, 975 P.2d at 1111.
30. See e.g. id.
31. E.g. People v. Ferguson, 526 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
32. E.g. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 39-40 (1976).
33. See e.g. U.S. v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560 (10th Cir. 1992).
34. For a discussion of the arguments in favor of the Frye test, see Reed v. State,
391 A.2d 364, 369-372 (Md. 1978).
35. Id. at 369-370.
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assuring that a minimal reserve of experts exist, who can critically
examine the validity of scientific evidence. Also, it is argued that the
conservative nature of Frye presents an important obstacle to
unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific
principles. 36  Critics of Frye, however, argue that the rule's overly
restrictive nature produces unjust results.3 7 The limitations on one or a
small number of scientists and the use of "cutting edge" technology
often mean exclusion of potentially reliable evidence and a "justice
delayed is justice denied" situation. Some critics have emphasized the
problems with inherent bias of funded research and the difficulty in
producing impartial and disinterested experts. Other courts have
stressed that the general acceptance test is not in conformity with the
spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the courts ask why
uncertainty in the scientific community should deprive the fact finder
of the opportunity to hear evidence on a particular subject. 38 These
criticisms of the Frye rule led to a steady retreat by the courts from the
general acceptance by scientists' standard to a more flexible test for
determining reliability of scientific evidence, which is more compatible
with the new evidence rules. Following the codification of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, many courts construed the Rules' refusal to
adopt a separate test for scientific evidence as a rejection of the Frye
rule. These courts turned away from the novelty requirement of Frye
and applied the same basic principles of evidence law to all expert
witnesses. Basic reliability was determined by the qualifications of the
expert and a description of the expertise of the witness. 39 As in all
cases, the court determined the logical relevancy of the evidence.
40
The court further determined that the evidence of the qualified expert
would assist the trier of fact, a helpfulness test beyond that required to
meet the standard of logical relevance, and that the expert's opinion is
properly based.4 1 Lastly, the court considered whether the probative
value of the expert testimony is substantially outweighed by any of the
trial concerns of the doctrine of legal relevancy.42  In this
36. For a discussion of the arguments against the Frye test, see U.S. v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1236-1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
37. See generally Downing, 753 F.2d 1224.
38. Id.
39. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
40. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-402 (2004).
41. See Fed. R. Evid. 702-703.
42. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (2004).
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determination, in the exercise of discretion, the trial court judge may
consider such factors as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,




The main alternative to the Frye rule is the Daubert test, which is
applied in federal courts and has been adopted in many states. Under
Daubert, the flexibility of the Federal Rules of Evidence is used by the
trial court judge to assess the reliability of scientific knowledge and its
connection to the issues of the case. Daubert held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting
scientific testimony in a federal trial.44 The Court held that Frye's
general acceptance test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 45  "Faced with a proffer of expert scientific
testimony' ' 6 under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the trial court,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), must make a preliminary
assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasons or
methodology are scientifically valid (a reliability determination) and
"can [properly] be applied to the facts in issue ' '47 (a relevancy
determination). Daubert prescribed a recipe whereby the trial court
judge considers various factors, which include whether the scientific
theory or technique: (1) "can be (and has been) tested"; 48 (2) is
"subject[] to peer review and publication"; 49 (3) "the known or
potential rate of error"; 50 (4) "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling ... operation"; 51 and (5) attracts widespread
acceptance within the relevant scientific community. 52  The Court
emphasized that the trial court's inquiry is to be flexible, with the focus
solely on principle and methodology and not the conclusions
43. Id.
44. 509 U.S. at 587.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 592.
47. Id. at 592-593.
48. Id. at 593.
49. Id.




10 WHITTIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY ADVOCACY [Vol. 4:1
generated.53 The Court also stated that the trial "jud e... should also
be mindful of other applicable rules of evidence. ' 'J" On remand of
Daubert, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Daubert I) 55
provided some guidance on how to determine whether the proposed
expert testimony reflects scientific knowledge (the first of the two
Daubert hurdles). The Ninth Circuit held that scientific knowledge
may be established in two principal ways - showing that the expert will
testify about research conducted independently of the litigation or
showing that the research has been subjected to peer review. 56 The
court also noted that failure in the first method would not be significant
in the context of "scientific endeavors closely tied to law
enforcement." 57  This analysis is illustrated with fingerprint5859
evidence. 58 In U.S. v. Mitchell, the expert's testimony that the latent
fingerprint recovered from the crime scene matched the defendant's
fingerprints was admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, the court
holding that fingerprint methodology is testable and the error rate is
near zero.
60
The list of factors in Daubert is not exclusive. The courts are
permitted to identify other factors not discussed in Daubert to insure
the scientific reliability of expert testimony. For example, the courts
may have to consider whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated
from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. In General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,6 1 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that in some
cases the trial court "may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." 2  The
53. Id. at 594-595.
54. Id. at 595.
55. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
56. Id. at 1317-1318. The courts have discussed two kinds of peer review - "true"
peer review, where scientific claims are evaluated by members of the relevant
discipline through independent scientific investigation, and "editorial" peer review,
which leads merely to publication in a published journal following referral of an article
by a journal editor to two or more outside reviewers. For a discussion of peer review in
the Daubert context, see generally Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp.
666 (D. Nev. 1996).
57. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n. 5.
58. Id.
59. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
60. Id. at 235-246.
61. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
62. Id. at 146.
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courts may consider whether the expert has adequately accounted for
obvious alternative explanations. 63  Also, the court may determine
whether the expert "is being as careful as he would be in his regular
professional work outside his paid litigation consulting." 64  Some
courts read Daubert to require the trial court to assure itself that the
expert "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."65 A
further inquiry is whether the field of expertise is known to reach
reliable results for the type of opinion the expert will give.66  In
Kumho, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that Daubert's general
acceptance factor does not "help show that an expert's testimony is
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability as, for example, do
theories grounded in... principles of astrology or necromancy."
67
One court has rejected testimony based upon "clinical ecology" as
unfounded and unreliable. 6 8 Whatever Daubert-authorized factors are
considered by the court, the trial judge must have considerable leeway
in deciding in a particular case how to determine whether the expert
testimony is reliable. "[N]ot only must each stage of the expert's
testimony be reliable, but each stage must be evaluated practically and
flexibly without bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.
' 6
Several states have found DNA evidence to provide the
opportunity to retreat from the general acceptance analysis of the Frye
test to adopt the more flexible approach of Daubert.70  Defense
objections about laboratory practices and contamination of samples
continue to be considered, and some courts consider these problems to
go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence. 7 1 Other
courts, which no longer follow the Frye rule, continue to rely upon the
technique's general acceptance in the scientific community asS 72
authorized by Daubert. Some courts have applied the more flexible
Daubert test to scrap the per se rule of inadmissibility of all
63. Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997).
65. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
66. Id. at 151.
67. Id.
68. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208-1209 (6th Cir. 1988).
69. Heller v. Shaw Ind, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999).
70. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 2002).
71. See e.g. U.S. v. Martinez, 3 F.3d1 191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993).
72. See e.g. U.S. v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1995).
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unstipulated polygraph evidence. 73  These courts note scientific
advances in polygraph techniques since it was rejected in Frye.74 The
courts state that when Frye was decided, the polygraph machine
measured only changes in a subject's systolic blood pressure, while
modem polygraph machines measure changes in blood pressure, pulse,
respiration, and galvanic skin response. 75 Current estimates are that
the polygraph technique gives an accurate reading of truth or falsity
76 77seventy to ninety percent of the time. In U.S. v. Galbreth, the court
held that the results of a polygraph examination, where administered by
a competent polygraph examiner is a valid scientific technique and,
therefore, admissible under Daubert.78 Other courts emphasize that the
"bright-line" exclusionary rule with respect to polygraph results is
inconsistent with the "flexible inquiry" assigned to the trial judge by
Daubert.79  These courts note that the trial judge must not only
evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but also
consider its admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.80 In
Cordoba, the court of appeals reviewed the district court's conclusions
on the problems with polygraph evidence - a lack of reliable error rate
conclusions for "real life" polygraph testing; a lack of general
acceptance in the scientific community for using polygraph testing to
determine facts for presentation in court; and a lack of "reliable and
accepted standards controlling polygraphy." 81 The court upheld the
district court's conclusion that polygraph evidence does not meet the
standard in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 set forth in Daubert.82 Other
courts have held that even if the technique used by the polygraph
examiner satisfies Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted by
Daubert, the results are not sufficiently apropriative to survive
Federal Rule of Evidence 403's balancing test.
It has been held that the rejection of expert testimony under
73. Id.
74. Id. at 434.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995).
78. Id. at 893,895.
79. See e.g. U.S. v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1058-1062.
82. Id. at 1062.
83. See e.g. US. v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
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Daubert is the exception rather than the rule. 84 In Daubert, the Court
stated that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on burden of proof are traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
85
"[T]he trial court's role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a
replacement for the adversary system .... ,86 As the Supreme Court
observed in Kumho, the trial court has discretion to "avoid unnecessary
'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an
expert's methods [are] taken for granted, and to require [a hearing] in
less ... usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the
expert's reliability arises. '' 7 Despite the flexible inquiry of Daubert,
much evidence is excluded by the courts. For example, under Daubert,
research on which an expert based the finding that fungicide damaged
the plaintiffs crops was unreliable; 88 expert testimony that a defendant
did not fit the sexual offender profile was unreliable and inadmissible,
the court, citing Daubert and Rule 702, and noting that there is no test
or group of tests which can determine if a person is likely to be a
sexual offender. 89 Expert testimony on hedonic damages in a police
shooting case was inadmissible, where testimony that sought to place a
price tag on human life was based on the willingness-to-pay model,
because it was not grounded solidly enough in the scientific method to
clear the hurdle of Federal Rule of Evidence 702; the court further
noted that such testimony can be misleading and thus is excludable
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.90 Also, expert testimony that the
decedent's exposure to halothane caused hepatitis and death was not
sufficiently reliable and was, therefore, inadmissible; 91  hair
comparison testimony is inadmissible under Daubert (there are few
scientific studies of hair comparison and those available indicate the
method is unreliable and there is a risk of the jury being overawed by
84. U.S. v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore County, Miss., 80 F.3d 1074,
1078 (5th Cir. 1996).
85. 509 U.S. at 596.
86. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1078.
87. 526 U.S. at 1176.
88. E.I du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558-560 (Tex.
1995).
89. State v. Cavaliere, 663 A.2d 96, 100 (N.H. 1995).
90. Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1064 (N.D. I11. 1995).
91. Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 887 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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supposed scientific evidence); 92 a defendant's offer of expert testimony
on eyewitness identification fails Daubert and Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 because the defendant did not offer or describe any of the
studies purportedly supporting the expert's opinion (without the
studies, there was no way for the court to evaluate, as Daubert requires,
the scientific validity of the reasoning and methodology underlying the
expert's testimony), and the court saw real danger that the evidence
would mislead and confuse the jury. 93 Further, the court set forth eight
considerations bearing on admissibility of recovered memories and
concluded that the phenomenon of recovered memory is not generally
accepted in the psychological community; 94 an FBI agent, who is an
expert in the investigative field known as forensic stylistics, may not,
pursuant to Daubert, testify in a criminal trial as to his opinion, based
upon review of writings known to have been authored by the
defendant, that the defendant also wrote certain threatening letters;
95
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that expert
testimony of one of the leading psychologists who helped develop the
use of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test as a field sobriety
test is not sufficient to support admission of evidence of the
defendant's performance on such a test at his trial for drunk driving,
the court noting that as a psychologist, rather than a medical doctor, the
state's witness was not an expert on physiological mechanisms that are
affected by alcohol ingestion and that result in HGN behavior.
96
Despite the flexible inquiry of Daubert and the usefulness of its
non-exclusive list of factors, some states have rejected Daubert in
favor of retaining the Frye test or other state standards.9 7 Most states
limit the application of Frye to new or novel scientific techniques,
which leaves open the question whether state courts will adopt the
Kumho rule, which makes the Daubert factors applicable for expert
witness testimony (including experts who testify about technical and
other specialized knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
92. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp.1529, 1554-1555, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
93. US. v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923-924, 926 (9th Cir. 1994).
94. State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916, 925, 928 (N.H. 1997). This case illustrates
the possible reliance on the general acceptance test of Frye in a Daubert analysis. Id.
at 928.
95. US. v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523 (D.N.J. 2000).
96. State v. Lasworth, 42 P.3d 844, 847, 850 (N.M. App. 2001).
97. See e.g. People v. Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th 587, 591 (1994); State v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d
681, 692 (Neb. 1994); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996).
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One problem with extending Daubert to apply to "soft sciences,"
such as psychological evidence regarding the battered woman
syndrome (BWS), the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS), and other syndromes or behavioral profiles, is that many of
these theories have only been developed recently.98  As a result,
experts may lack the data they need to determine the theory's merits.
99
This makes it difficult for a judge to decide whether or not a particular
syndrome is falsifiable. 100 If experts in the field do not have the data
to make such a determination, it is unlikely that a judge will.
Moreover, many of these behavioral theories cannot meet the
"falsifiable" requirement of the Daubert test no matter how much
analysis they undergo. 1 1 Experts (and judges, for that matter) may
have no means of determining the existence or non-existence of
syndromes such as BWS or CSAAS. For example, a party asserting
the existence of one of these syndromes could always argue that the
non-existence of behavior associated with the syndrome means only
that the alleged victim has repressed the psychotic behavior. 102 This is
98. See generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., The Globalization of Behavioral
Science Evidence about Battered Women: A Theory of Production and Diffusion, 15
Behavioral Sci. & L. 285, 290 (1997) [hereinafter Gatowski, Globalization] (discussing
the relatively recent emergence of BWS as a viable scientific theory).
99. See James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to
Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 Judicature 10, 12-13 (1995) [hereinafter
Richardson, Problems]; cf James T. Richardson, Dramatic Changes in American
Expert Evidence Law, 2 The Judicial Review 13, 23 (1996) [hereinafter Richardson,
Dramatic] ("The courts have sometimes sought refuge in Frye-like principles in order
to bring some order out of what appears to be a chaotic situation of there appearing to
be a new syndrome developed every month."). Id.
100. Richardson, Problems, supra n. 99, at 12-13.
101. See Richardson, Dramatic, supra n. 99, at 25 (noting that Daubert's
falsifiability requirement may call into question the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
used by the American Psychiatric Association). Shirley A. Dobbin & Sophia I.
Gatowski, The Social Production of Rape Trauma Syndrome as Science and as
Evidence, in Science in Court 125, 134 (Michael Freeman & Helen Reece, eds.,
Ashgate Publishing. 1999); Richardson, Problems, supra n. 99, at 13 (finding "no way
to falsify" Freudian syndrome diagnoses "unless conditions are specified that
determine which of the consequences of the trauma will occur under which
circumstances."); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., The Diffusion of Scientific Evidence: A
Comparative Analysis of Admissibility Standards in Australia, Canada, England, and
the United States, and Their Impact on Social and Behavioural Sciences, 4 Expert
Evid. 86, 90 (1996) [hereinafter Gatowski, Diffusion].
102. See Dobbin & Gatowski, supra n. 101, at 134 ("Many commentators suggest
that widespread acceptance of questionable syndrome evidence that has limited
scientific reliability and questionable probative value may result in a high number of
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particularly troubling since Daubert identified the "key question" for
the trial judge as "whether the theory or technique in question had been
tested." 1 03 As such, syndromes can never satisfy Daubert because they
are not testable. Courts that choose to rely on evidence stemming from
a theory about this or that syndrome embrace what is in reality not a
scientific theory at all. 104  The result is that the court adopts an
inherently unreliable test, which can lead to a disproportionate number
of "false positives."' 105  In criminal trials, this could mean that an
innocent party goes to jail as a sex offender on evidence that at best
neither proves nor disproves anything and, at worse, affirmatively
misleads a fact finder into issuing a verdict against the innocent
defendant. 106
THE KUMHO DECISION
Under Kumho, the federal trial court's gatekeeper obligation
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted in Daubert, is to
ensure that the expert's testimony is both relevant and reliable, and
applies not just to testimony based upon "scientific knowledge," but
also applies to testimony based upon "technical" and "other
specialized" knowledge. When the specific Daubert factors are
reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case, the trial court
may consider them in making the reliability determination. In U.S. v.
Hankey, 107 the court held that a police officer's specialized knowledge
about a street gang's code of silence is admissible under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 to impeach a member's testimony (to show bias) and
to exculpate the defendant. The court properly performed its
false positives.); Richardson, Problems, supra n. 99, at 13. For an interesting
discussion of the inability to falsify whether members of alternative religions ("cults")
suffer from mental illness, cf James T. Richardson, Mental Health of Cult Consumers:
Legal and Scientific Controversy, in Religion and Mental Health 233 (John F.
Schumaker, ed., Oxford University Press 1992).
103. Richardson, Problems, supra n. 99, at 12 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. 579).
104. Id. ("According to Popperian philosophy of science, a theory that is in principle
falsifiable but has never been subjected to testing does not qualify as a scientific
theory.").
105. See Richardson, Dramatic, supra n. 99, at 26 ("Other types of predictions of
child sex abuse are also suspect in that they lead to an unacceptably high number of
'false positives'....").
106. See id (defining false positives as "identifying an individual as abused or an
abuser when it is not true.") (quotation omitted).
107. 203 F.3d 1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000).
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gatekeeper role as set out in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho. In U.S. v.
Hines,108  the court held that absence of empirical studies
demonstrating the reliability of handwriting comparison evidence
(traditionally admissible special-skill evidence) results in exclusion of a
portion of the expert's testimony (as to the conclusion that the
defendant was the author of a stick-up note), applying Kumho.
109
As noted above, state rules may differ. In State v. Fukusaku,
110
the court held that expert testimony based on technical knowledge (hair
and fiber comparison) does not call for the same searching inquiry into
reliability that is required for scientific evidence under Hawaii Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert, noting that expert testimony on other pes
of knowledge is treated differently from "scientific knowledge." In
State v. Vumback, 112 the court did not adopt the Kumho rule and held
that expert testimony on the complainant's lack of precision and delays
in reporting abuse is not "scientific evidence" subject to the
requirements of Daubert.113 The courts have relaxed the application of
Daubert under certain circumstances. In McGrew v. State, 14 the court
stated that a short and relatively simple inquiry into the reliability of
microscopic hair analysis is sufficient under Daubert.115 The expert
testified that his work involved no "scientific principle" but merely a
microscopic comparison of hairs, which the expert stated was generally
accepted.116  The court noted that where the scientific principles
involved are not "advanced and complex" then the foundation need not
be advanced and complex either. Other state courts have applied
Daubert more restrictively. In State v. Ayers,1 1 8 the court held that the
Daubert analysis does not apply to evidence of likelihood ratio for a
mixed DNA sample. 119 The court noted that the ratios, used to prove
that someone was the source of some of the DNA, is not a novel
108. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
109. Id. at 70-71.
110. 946 P.2d 32 (Haw. 1997).
111. Id. at 43.
112. 791 A.2d 569 (Conn. App. 2002).
113. Id. at 578-580.
114. 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997).
115. Id. at 1290-1291.
116. Id. at 1291.
117. Id. at 1292.
118. 68 P.3d 768 (Mont. 2003).
119. Id. at 776-777.
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scientific technique, and therefore admission in a rape case of evidence
of a likelihood ratio is not governed by Daubert. 
120
The Daubert-Kumho test did not eliminate the gatekeeper
function of the trial judge so much as it altered it. Under the Frye test,
the challenge the trial judge faces is whether the scientific evidence
proffered is sufficiently established, or whether the evidence is too
novel for the court to admit. Daubert and Kumho require a trial judge
to depart from the Frye analysis and instead conduct a substantive
analysis of all expert evidence. In the world of Daubert and Kumho,
the judge may not conclude automatically that evidence is unreliable
simply because the techniques used to gather it are new; instead, the
court must determine the reliability of the evidence ad hoc, considering
a variety of factors in addition to the esteem that the evidence-
gathering method enjoys. 12 1 As such, the gatekeeper's challenge under
Daubert and Kumho is essentially one about the meaning of
"reliability." Doing so is not an easy task, as "reliability" is a difficult
concept to define initially, and the definition may be subject to
renegotiation. As a result, a judge applying the Daubert criteria needs
to apply some additional sub-criteria as well. Doing so ensures that
science does not become a reason inadvertently to tip the scales of an
adversarial proceeding in favor of one of the parties. These criteria
include: 1) the extent to which the method of gathering evidence itself
prevents a Daubert reliability analysis; 2) the extent to which the legal-
cultural context surrounding the evidence inhibits an objective
determination of reliability; and 3) the extent to which the judge's own
personality and experiences will affect his or her decision as to whether
expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY IN CHILDREN'S CASES
In recent years, the courts have seen a proliferation of
psychological evidence in cases involving children and families. This
evidence is obviously different from expert evidence derived from hard
science, but it nevertheless presents the court with issues involving
scientific analysis. Often, this soft, social and behavioral science
evidence is not far beyond the common experience of jurors (e.g.,
eyewitness identification testimony and fantasies of children), and
often reflects (directly or indirectly) on witness credibility.
120. Id.
121. See Richardson, Dramatic, supra n. 99, at 16.
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Psychological evidence also presents the court with the familiar
question of whether the impact of anything "scientific" is prejudicial.
Courts continue to be concerned about the floodgates problem with the
ongoing development of new behavioral profiles and syndromes and
are concerned about the "evidentiary imperative," which says that now
that this behavioral evidence exists, the court, therefore, should admit
it. This article identifies three categories of behavioral science
evidence which are widely considered by courts in child cases and
considers how adaptable this evidence is to the tests of Frye, Daubert,
and Kumho.
"TRAITS EVIDENCE"- VICTIMS
Traits evidence with respect to victims consists of a generalized
description of the psychological and emotional characteristics of child
victims of maltreatment (abuse or neglect) and the expert's opinion that
the victim in question exhibits such traits. The expert may attempt to
define credibility and describe profiles to measure credibility in abused
children. The testimony of the expert seeks to compare patterns in the
victim's behavior in the case at hand with clinically observed patterns
common to other similarly situated victims (e.g., child sex abuse
victims). Similarly, traits evidence, which may be described as a
profile or syndrome, is limited to offering an explanation of certain
behaviors by the victim (as opposed to being a test for whether the
alleged perpetrator did it). For example, expert testimony on BWS is
admissible to explain the victim's prolonged endurance of physical
abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, or122
delays in reporting or recanting allegations. Expert testimony on
BWS is admissible to explain why an alleged first-time victim of
domestic violence recants her testimony.123 Rape trauma syndrome
(RTS) is admissible under the Frye test in a child sex abuse trial to
assist the jury in understanding behavioral patterns of child sex abuse
victims.
As one would expect, the courts vary in their degree of
acceptance of different types of traits evidence, whether or not labeled
as a syndrome or profile. An important problem noted by some courts
is that the syndrome or profile is over-inclusive (i.e., the traits may
122. See e.g. People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194, 202, 205 (Mich. 1995).
123. See e.g. People v. Salinas, 106 Cal. App. 4th 993, 998-1000 (5th Dist. 2003).
124. See e.g. State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271, 277 (S.D. 1989).
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arise from other experiences). In State v. Ballard,125 the court held that
expert testimony on. post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS) is
inadmissible in a child sex abuse case. 126 The court noted that expert
testimony invades the province of the jury to decide credibility of
witnesses and the symptoms listed may be exhibited by children who
are distressed for other reasons. 12 7  In Lantrip v. Kentucky, 12 8 the
defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of his adopted
daughter. 12 9 At the trial, a witness with a M.S.W. degree and who had
evaluated the victim, described the victim's behavior following the
incident as fulfilling the guidelines of the CSAAS. 13 0 The witness
listed five elements of the syndrome: (1) "secrecy" about the sexual
abuse, often insured by threats of negative consequences of disclosure;
(2) "helplessness" to resist or complain; (3) "entrapment and
accommodation," where the child sees no way to escape ongoing abuse
and learns to adapt; (4) "delay in disclosure," which is often conflicted
and unconvincing; and (5) "retraction," in an attempt to restore order to
the family structure when disclosure threatens to destroy it. 131 The
court reversed the conviction, finding that the syndrome had not
attained scientific acceptance among clinical psychologists or
psychiatrists. 132 The court further noted that even if the syndrome
should receive such acceptance, it doubted its use in Kentucky, because
the question of whether a child who had not been abused could also
develop the same symptoms would continue to discredit the use of the
syndrome. 1
33
The courts are also concerned about the risk of bleed-over from
traits evidence to the often impermissible ultimate opinion of the expert
witness. In State v. Cressey,134 the court held that expert testimony
that a child's symptoms were consistent with those of a sexually
abused child was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence
125. 855 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1993).
126. Id. at 562-563.
127. Id. at 562.
128. 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986).
129. Id. at 816.




134. 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993).
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that she was sexually abused. 135  The court would not distinguish
between testimony by the expert that the children's symptoms were
consistent with those of sexually abused children and testimony that, in
the expert's opinion, the children were sexually abused. 136 Both types
of testimony would lead a jury to think the expert believed that the
children were sexually abused. 13 7  Some courts have taken a more
realistic view and have recognized that the bleed-over from traits
evidence to credibility is inevitable. In People v. Koon,138 a defendant
was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault on his
twelve-year-old stepdaughter. 139  At trial, a police psychologist
qualified as an expert in the field of victim psychology, described
"4certain... behavioral patterns which are unique to child incest
victims, and [their] families." 140 A social worker testified, based upon
her observations of the victim's behavior, that the victim's "behavioral
characteristics were the same as ... described by the police
psychologist." 14 1 The court recognized the distinction between rape
trauma syndrome and "child sexual abuse syndrome," and recognized
that the child sexual abuse syndrome may be introduced, despite the
fact that it may incidentally create the inference that the victim is or is
not telling the truth about the specific incident. 142 The court noted that
expert "testimonyl4inevitably] bolster[s] or attack[s] the credibility of
another witness." In Frenzel v. State,144 the expert witness related
the victim's behavior to each of the five characteristics of CSAAS,
describing the victim's behavior as consistent with CSAAS. 145 The
court held that the expert's testimony was proper and did not vouch
directly for the credibility of the child; however, the court
acknowledged the "incidental effect of supporting the victim's
credibility."' 14 6 Similarly, in Ward v. State,147 the court held that a
135. Id. at 699.
136. Id. at 699-700.
137. Id. at 700.
138. 724 P.2d 1367 (Colo. App. Div. 111986).
139. Id. at 1369.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1370.
143. Id.
144. 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1993).
145. Id. at 745-746.
146. Id. at 746.
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psychologist's opinion that a child sex abuse complainant displayed
symptoms consistent with those of sexually abused children did not
impermissibly bolster the credibility of the child. 14 8 The court noted
that vouching was not direct but a necessary incident of the expert's
testimony. 
14
Traits evidence pertaining to victims, not necessarily stated in
profile or syndrome terms, is widely accepted by the courts, primarily
because the evidence helps jurors evaluate and comprehend matters not
within their common experience. The courts have emphasized the
limited purposes for traits evidence. Several courts have discussed the
helpfulness of CSAAS evidence to prove why the child delayed in
reporting and recantation, secrecy and delayed disclosure, and to
rehabilitate the child rather than prove substantive guilt of the alleged
perpetrator. 150  CSAAS evidence is usually offered in rebuttal once
evidence is offered which is inconsistent with child abuse. The limited
purpose of the evidence was discussed in State v. Middleton,151 where
the court held that traits evidence is not admissible to show that the
offense actually occurred, but is only admissible to explain any
seeminlI inconsistent response to the trauma exhibited by the
victim. V Similarly, in People v. Wells, 153 the court emphasized that
testimony regarding CSAAS is admissible only to disabuse jurors of
myths concerning expected behavior of victims of sexual abuse, not to
"prove that... molestation actually occurred." 154
Some courts reject traits evidence for its improper bolstering of
the credibility of the alleged victim and thereby invading the province
of the jury.155 Other courts hold that traits evidence does not pass the
standard for scientific evidence. 15 6 In Cressey, the court held that a
147. 519 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1988).
148. Id. at 1084-1085.
149. Id. at 1084.
150. See e.g. Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274 (Del. 1987); State v. Payton, 481
N.W.2d 325 (Iowa 1992); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1130 (La. 1993); State v.
J.Q, 599 A.2d 172, 174 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1991).
151. 657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983).
152. Id. at 1221.
153. 118 Cal. App. 4th 179 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2004).
154. Id.at 188.
155. See Commw. v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. 1991), overruled,
Commw. v. Johnson, 690 A.2d 274 (Pa. Super. 1997).
156. See Cressey, 628 A.2d at 700.
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psychologist's testimony, based on art therapy and other techniques,
that the complaining witness in a child sex abuse case had symptoms
consistent with those of abuse victims was not sufficiently reliable.
157
In People v. Leon,158 the court held that CSAAS is not generally
accepted in the scientific community pursuant to the Kelly-Frye rule. 1
"TRAITS EVIDENCE" - ALLEGED PERPETRA TORS
Traits evidence pertaining to alleged perpetrators consists of a
generalized description of psychological and emotional characteristics
of alleged perpetrators of, for example, sexual abuse, and the expert's
opinion that the alleged perpetrator exhibits such traits. Unlike
victims' traits evidence, evidence of traits of alleged perpetrators is
generally excluded by the courts. Evidence of traits that alleged
perpetrators exhibit may violate due process. In State v. Clements,
160
the expert witness testified that sexual abusers of children generally fall
into two categories: "fixated" offenders, whose sexual attraction to
other children becomes fixed during adolescence and who are not
amenable to treatment, and "regressed" offenders, whose desire for
children results suddenly from a stressful event and whose treatment
prognosis is good.161 The court held that the expert's testimony on the
child sex abuser profile, together with the prosecutor's efforts to link
the accused to a typical "fixated" pedophile, created an improper
inference of guilt and denied the defendant a fair trial. 162 Evidence of
traits of alleged perpetrators may also raise an improper inference of
character. In civil proceedings, the law of evidence prohibits
substantive character proof unless character is an issue in the case.
16 3
In criminal cases, substantive character is not admissible to prove
conduct, unless the accused opens the door with his good character, in
the form of reputation or opinion, or offers evidence of the victim's
character. 164 In Sanders v. State,165 the court held that the expert's
157. Id. at 699.
158. 263 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1989), review denied and ordered not
published.
159. Id. at 84.
160. 770 P.2d 447 (Kan. 1989).
161. Id. at 454.
162. Id.
163. Fed. R. Evid. 404-405 (2004).
164. Id.; Fed R. Evid. 608 (2004).
165. 303 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. 1983).
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testimony relating to the battering parent syndrome (BPS) improperly
implicated the defendant's character, even though the expert never
expressly formed a conclusion that the defendant fit the profile of a
battering parent. 166 Similarly, in U.S. v. Quigley, 167 the court held that
the government should not have been allowed to introduce extensive
expert testimony about characteristics of the typical drug courier (drug
courier profile) and how the defendant matched those characteristics as
substantive evidence to establish that the defendant intended to
distribute a kilogram of cocaine found in the car he was driving. 168 In
Brunson v. State,169 the court excluded expert witness opinion
testimony that a spousal murder defendant fit the profile of men who
kill their wives because the evidence invaded the province of the jury
and was more prejudicial than probative. 170  The expert witness
identified the defendant as one who met eight of ten risk factors for a
batterer who will turn murderer.171 The witness explained that the
factors were taken from an article by a police officer that surveyed
70,000 cases. 172  Surprisingly, the court did not examine the
application of the law of character evidence or Daubert to this case.
One area where evidence of traits of alleged perpetrators is
admitted by the courts is as rebuttal evidence. In U.S. v. Beltran-
Rios,173 the court held that the prosecution could introduce expert
testimony that the defendant shared a number of physical
characteristics with the "typical drug courier," to rebut the defendant's
claim that he was a "poor simple farmer." 174 The defendant opened
the door by suggesting that he was not part of a drug "smuggling
operation because he lack[ed] the accoutrements of wealth associated
with such profitable activity."175
166. Id. at 18.
167. 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989).
168. Id. at 1024.
169. 79 S.W.3d 304 (Ark. 2002).
170. Id. at 311.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 308.
173. 878 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1989).
174. Id. at 1210, 1213.
175. Id. at 1212.
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"GENERAL TRUTH"
The term "general truth" is used to describe testimony, which is
couched in general terms, that children are unlikely to fabricate claims
of sexual abuse. This evidence addresses the child's ability to separate
truth from fantasy and may include the expert's opinion that the child
in question fits into the category. Some courts reject general truth
evidence because the inference to be drawn on the likelihood of
fabrication or fantasy is that the child is telling the truth, which is
generally regarded as an improper invasion of the province of the
jury. 176  Also, some courts consider general truth to be improper
bolstering of the credibility of a witness who has not been attacked on177 178
cross-examination or otherwise. In State v. Myers, the court held
that it was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to the defendant for
the court to admit an opinion on matters that directly or indirectly
renders an opinion on the credibility of a witness. 179  In U.S. v.
Binder,180 the court held that the experts' opinion that child victims can
"distinguish reality from fantasy and truth from falsehood...
bolster[ed] the children's testimony and... usurp[ed] the jury's...181 182
function." In Commonwealth v. Rather, the court held that the
expert's reply to a hypothetical question about child abuse victims
"impliedly" vouched for their credibility. 183 The court recognized that
the line separating proper expert testimony on patterns of disclosure
and improper vouching for a child witness is a narrow one. 184 The
court in Rather offered suggestions to address this issue: (1) a thorough
voir dire of the expert out of the jury's presence; (2) warning the expert
witness that opinions as to credibility of:the child witness testimony or
as to the general veracity of child abuse victims were not allowed; and
(3) careful jury instructions outlining the proper use of expert
testimony. 185 Courts have also found that general truth evidence deals
with matters not beyond the ken of ordinary lay jurors. In State v.
176. Roberson v. State, 447 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. App. 1994).
177. Seeid.
178. 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986).
179. Id. at 97-98.
180. 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985).
181. Id. at 602.
182. 638 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. App. 1994).
183. Id. at 919-920.
184. Id. at 919.
185. Id. at 920-921.
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Mazerolle,186 the court held that the expert may not testify on the issue
of fabrication by children, ages five, seven, and nine. 18 7 The expert
would have stated that children's allegations could be childhood
fantasies because they involve factors not usually found in child abuse
cases. 188 The court stated that the jury was capable of drawing a
conclusion about the believability of the children's allegations. 189 The
courts also exclude general truth because it is not helpful (i.e., it will
not assist the fact finder). 190
Despite these potential problems with general truth evidence,
many courts find the evidence to be helpful and admissible. In Ex
parte Hill,191 the court held that expert testimony by social workers
that children, in general, do not fabricate allegations of sexual abuse
and that recantation of such allegations is not unusual is admissible at a
rape and sexual abuse trial. 192 The court stated that the testimony
indirectly bolstered the credibility of the complaining witness, but was
nevertheless helpful to the jury, and that confusion, "shame[,] and guilt
associated with sexual abuse of children are beyond the ken of the
average juror."' 193  In People v. Fasy,194 the court held that expert
testimony on post-traumatic stress disorder assisted the jury in
understanding the child's behavior after the incident and explained her
delayed reporting. 195 In Hall v. State,196 the court held that a clinical
social worker's testimony that the child victim's behavior was
"strongly associated with his being a victim of child sexual abuse" 19 7
did not amount to an impermissible expression of opinion on the
truthfulness of another's testimony (even though the testimony came in
response to the prosecutor asking if the behavior was "basically caused
by , 198 abuse).
199
186. 614 A.2d 68 (Me. 1992).




191. 553 So.2d 1138 (Ala. 1989).
192. Id. at 1138-1139.
193. Id. at 1139.
194. 829 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1992).
195. Id. at 1317.
196. 670 A.2d 962 (Md. Spec. App. 1996).
197. Id. at 964, 967.
198. Id.at 964.
FRYE, DA UBERT, AND KUMHO
"PARTICULAR TRUTH"
"Particular truth" expert witnesses' opinion consists of evidence
that a child witness was telling the truth during in court or out-of-court
testimony. The evidence may include a credibility assessment of the
child, with helpfulness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, enhanced
by consideration of various diagnostic criteria. In People v. Aldrich,200
the court considered various "validation" criteria as professional
standards for assessing the credibility of children alleging sexual abuse
(e.g., mental age versus chronological age, intelligence, level of
suggestibility of the child, motivation for disclosure, consistency in
details of the child's story to others, physical evidence, background
documentation, and history of confabulation on sexual matters).
20 1
Some courts hold that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is not intended to
permit experts to give a particularized opinion on the credibility of a
child witness and, thereby, tell the jury what result to reach.2 °2 Other
courts make a distinction between an expert's opinion that a child has
the ability to tell the truth, rather than an opinion that the child is telling
203the truth. One court has held that an expert witness may properly
give an opinion that a child abuse victim was "genuine" in her
expressed emotional state following a sexual assault. 20 4  The court
noted that the expert's testimony was neither substantive character
proof nor was it expert opinion on the credibility of the child.2° ' The
victim had merely been responding to the expert's questions regarding
her emotional state and not to any questions that actually touched upon
whether the rape occurred or who might have committed it.
206
As a general rule, particular truth evidence is rejected by the
courts. Some courts consider particularized opinion to invade the
province of the juro , who alone determine witness credibility. 207 InPeople v. Matlock, the court held that an expert's opinion as to the
199. Id. at 965, 967.
200. 849 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1992).
201. Id. at 827-828.
202. See e.g. Commw. v. Carter, 403 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Mass. App. 1980).
203. E.g. Headv. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988).
204. State v. Wise, 390 S.E.2d 142, 145 (N.C. 1990).
205. Id. at 146.
206. Id.
207. See State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Haw. 1982), overruled, State v.
Batangan, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990).
208. 395 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. App. 1986).
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"truthfulness of her patients' and children's stories of sexual abuse
placed an impermissible stamp of scientific legitimacy to the truth" of
the twelve-year-old victim's story. 209 In State v. Jackson,2 10 the court
held that testimony by two child abuse investigators that a child was
telling the truth was reversible error because the witnesses attempted to
serve as "human lie detectors for the child. ' 211 In Head, the court
noted that traits evidence and general truth evidence are admissible, but
the court disallowed an expert's opinion on the truth of the child's
testimony because the opinion invaded the province of the jury. 2 12 In
Zabel v. State,2 13 the court held that an expert's testimony regarding
the credibility of a child abuse victim improperly invaded the province
of the jury and was prejudicial (where there was no physical evidence
of abuse). 2 14 In State v. Boston,2 15 the court held that expert opinion
that a child had not fantasized her abuse and had not been programmed
"was not only improper - it was egregious, prejudicial and constitutes
reversible error," and infringed upon the roll of the fact finder.
2 16
However, in State v. Gersin,2 17 the court held that a defendant's expert
witness testimony concerning proper protocol for interviewing alleged
victims of child abuse is admissible under the Ohio counterpart to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.2 18 The court noted that such testimony
can assist the jury by making it aware of accepted practices in
interviewing child witnesses. 2 19 The court stated "that the testimony
concerned, not [the] veracity [of the witness, as in Boston], but rather
the method and technique used by the prosecution's witnesses to elicit
the child's story."
220
Particular truth evidence is also excluded on the grounds that it
improperly bolsters the complainant's credibility before the witness has
209. Id. at 278.
210. 721 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1986).
211. Id. at 238.
212. Head, N.E.2d at 152-153.
213. 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).
214. Id. at 362-363.
215. 545 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1989), modified, State v. Dever, 596 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio
1992).
216. Id. at 1240.
217. 668 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio 1996).
218. Id. at 487.
219. Id. at 487-488.
220. Id. at 486, 489.
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first been discredited, which is required by Federal Rule of Evidence
608(a) and its state counterparts. In State v. Kim,221 the court held that
the expert's testimony was interpreted as vouching for the victim's
credibility as a witness.2 22 In State v. Rimmasch,2 23 the court held that
224the expert's opinion violated Rule 608(a). The court warned against
"modern oath-helpers who would largely usurp the fact-finding
function of [a] judge or jury.' 225 In Commonwealth v. Smith,226 the
court held that the expert's testimony, which opined that a child sex
abuse victim was telling the truth, amounted to evidence of the child's
reputation for veracity before it had been attacked, which is
impermissible under the rules of evidence.2 27 Other courts have held
that expert opinion on the credibility of the complainant is not beyond
the understanding of a lay jury and, therefore, expert testimony is not
necessary. Some courts have expressed rejection of the expert's
particularized opinion on the credibility of a child witness or declarant
as not being of assistance to the jury under the counterpart of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. It has also been held that the expert need not
literally state an opinion about another witness for the evidence to be
impermissible. 2  In State v. Haslam,229 the court held that expert
testimony with the same "substantive import" was improper, and thus
in a child abuse prosecution the child's counselor's testimony "that she
counseled [the child] for sexual-abuse recovery" was impermissible as
improper vouching of the child's credibility (improperly vouching for
OR improper vouching of).
2 3 0
Under certain circumstances, however, particular truth evidence
may be admissible. A few courts hold that where the expert's opinion
on truthfulness is outside the common knowledge of the jury that
assistance is necessary. In Kim [Haw.], the court held that child sex
abuse cases are different and deserve special attention because jurors
may not have special knowledge about the truthfulness of child
221. 350 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. 1986).
222. Id. at 351.
223. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
224. Id. at 392-393.
225. Id. at 392.
226. 567 A.2d 1080 (Pa. Super. 1989).
227. Id. at 1082.
228. See State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1995).
229. Id. at 905-906.
230. Id. at 905.
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victims. 2 3 1  In State v. Geyman,2 32 the court held that there is no
infringement on the jury's role as long as jurors remain free to accept
233or reject the expert's testimony. Also, the expert's particularized
opinion on the credibility of the child witness may be admissible as
rebuttal evidence. This may occur, for example, where a defendant
discredits the child's credibility by showing that the mother or other
caregiver did not believe the child for several months. The defendant
in this situation may waive responsive expert opinion on the "particular
truth" of the victim. In Adesiji v. State,234 the court held that the
defendant showed that the mother ("the ultimate expert on the
[victim's] credibility' 235) disbelieved the victim's complaints, and,
therefore, waived objection to the opinion on particular truth.236
THE GATEKEEPER'S CHALLENGE
Several recent studies reveal that often what judges believe is a
well established and reliable hypothesis, in fact, began as a political
and/or legal movement. Some scholars have suggested that, outside the
United States, common law jurisdictions take cues from one another as
to what evidence is sufficiently reliable for admission into court.
2 37
For most common law systems, then, science does not determine the
admissibility of evidence so much as the work of legal scholars and
judges, many of whom do not have an adequate understanding of what
constitutes a reliable scientific theory.2 38 If the first court to find a
231. 645 P.2dat 1338.
232. 729 P.2d 475 (Mont. 1986).
233. Id. at 480.
234. 384 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. App. 1986).
235. Id. at911-912.
236. Id.
237. See Gatowski, Globalization, supra n. 98, at 291 (finding that American case
law and legal commentary influences whether other common law jurisdictions will
admit a particular type of scientific evidence); Gatowski, Diffusion, supra n. 101, at 91
("Our research thus far indicates that the diffusion process, at least for novel social and
behavioural sciences ... typically seems to involve the development of such ideas
within the American legal context, with the ideas then being transmitted to other
countries via legal publications and research by attorneys seeking ways to handle
contemporary [issues].").
238. For a discussion of judges' general confusion as to what constitutes a good
scientific theory, see generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A
National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L.
& Hum. Behav. 433 (2001) [hereinafter Gatowski, Asking].
FRYE, DAUBERT, AND KUMHO
particular theory admissible correctly employs scientific criteria in
doing so, the fact that other jurisdictions borrow that court's conclusion
raises no problems. Such is not the case, however, when it comes to
behavioral sciences, and particularly the various syndromes, such as
rape trauma syndrome (RTS). Some of the same researchers argue that
RTS began not as a scientific development but as a political movement
associated with contemporary feminism.239 Only when the American
Psychiatric Association incorporated RTS in its Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders did the syndrome "solidify" its
position as a scientific theory rather than a political movement. 240 The
scholars describe this process as the development of an "evidence
industry," which in turn exports its views into other legal cultures via
case law and academic commentary.
241
Evidence of syndromes thus presents judges with the difficult, if
not impossible, task of distinguishing science from politics. Aside
from the obvious legal problems it raises, the confusion of social
science with sociopolitical movements can pose problems for those
who actually suffer from the syndrome in question. One scholar
concludes, "RTS has turned the reaction itself - the 'symptoms' - into
behaviour at best pitied and at worst condemned., 242 She explains that
relying on a syndrome to indicate whether or not a woman has been
raped victimizes the woman, turning her into a helpless, dependent
object, which cannot stand alone without support.24 3 Having removed
"women's rape experience from its social and political context," 244 a
theory that originated in the feminist movement now seems to
counteract many of that movement's goals. Although RTS differs by
definition from syndromes associated with child abuse, judges may
want to think over the policy concerns RTS raises before allowing
evidence of CSAAS or similar syndromes.
The final challenge trial judges must face when deciding whether
to admit evidence from the soft sciences comes from themselves. Even
assuming that trial judges remain perfectly objective, few may know
239. See Dobbin & Gatowski, supra n. 101, at 127.
240. Id. at 130 (noting that while the APA did not specifically list RTS in its manual
in 1980, it did list post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), of which "RTS has been
explicitly recognized as a classic form").
241. See Gatowski, Globalization, supra n. 98, at 291.
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enough about scientific processes in order to apply the Daubert criteria
correctly. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun assumed that trial judges
would have the scientific knowledge to apply the criteria.241 Chief
Justice Rehnquist questioned this assumption in his dissent. 246 History
may ultimately vindicate the Chief Justice. Most people, including
judges, would find it very difficult "to address directly the idea of how
theories-especially 'pet theories' in which they believe - should be
tested in order to pass muster in ... terms of falsifiability."
24 7
Empirical evidence supports this conclusion; one survey found that of
the state trial judges surveyed, the surveyors could "infer a true
understanding of the scientific meaning of falsifiability in [only] six
percent... of the judges' responses. '248  The surveyors could only
determine that four percent of the judges surveyed had a clear
understanding of "the scientific meaning of error rate." 249 The creators
of the survey concluded "judges have difficulty operationalizing the
Daubert criteria and applying them, especially with respect to
falsifiability and error rate." 50 This conclusion seems even grimmer
considering that oftentimes judges have personal biases that would lead
them to accept one scientific theory over another on non-scientific
grounds.
25 1
None of the scholarship suggests that the courts should abandon
Daubert and its companion cases. The message was instead one of
guarded acceptance. After all, in at least one survey, an overwhelming
majority of state trial judges found the Daubert criteria at least
245. Richardson, Dramatic, supra n' 99, at 16 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. 579).
246. Id. at 17.
247. Id. at 19; see also Richardson, Problems, n. 99, at 11 (finding that "judges' level
of understanding of scientific principles and methodology may ill prepare them to
evaluate science, including social science, as now required by Daubert..."); Gatowski,
Diffusion, supra n. 101, at 90 ("Some judges may also not be prepared to do a thorough
analysis of the underlying methodology of the proffered scientific claims..
248. Gatowski, Asking, supra n. 238, at 444.
249. Id. at 445, 447.
250. Id. at 452.
251. See Gatowski, Globalization, supra n. 98, at 296 ("We anticipate that the more
favorable the attitude of the judge towards science and its function in law, the more
likely it is that the judge will be open to its possible admissibility .... "); Gatowski,
Diffusion, supra n. 101, at 90 (acknowledging that judges' "personal feelings and
biases" can affect whether or not he or she will admit scientific evidence).
252. See Richardson, Dramatic, supra n. 99, at 19 (finding it "imperative" that
judges receive better education as to the scientific meanings of the Daubert criteria).
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somewhat helpful. 2 53 The evidence encourages judges to remember,
however, that the behavioral science they review is being introduced
into a legal proceeding. The principal challenge of the gatekeeper is to
remember that the purpose of gatekeeping is to protect the parties
before the court. A judge should not discount the context in order to
assume a role as the arbitrator of scientific truths that he or she may or
may not be able to identify correctly.254
CONCLUSION
In states that have adopted Daubert, the trial court's role as
gatekeeper is a significant change from the days of the Frye test.
Nevertheless, among its factors, Daubert included general acceptance
in the scientific community, which is a familiar analysis to judges in
Frye jurisdictions. In the post-Daubert world, state trial court judges
continue to struggle with the meaning of scientific knowledge and,
therefore, scientific evidence. Indeed, some courts continue to limit the
application of Daubert to new or novel scientific techniques, leaving
the trial court free to exercise discretion with respect to the
determination of the reliability of other subjects of expert testimony.
Most courts, however, interpret Daubert to not require a novelty
determination, but rather apply the Daubert factors to any scientific
subject described by the expert. Most states continue to not apply Frye
or Daubert to experts whose subjects comprise the specialized or other
technical knowledge prongs of Rule 702. It remains unclear as to
whether the Kumho decision will be adopted in most states, thereby
requiring a Daubert-type analysis every time an expert testifies in a
state court (which has adopted Daubert). Kumho represents a further
affirmation by the U.S. Supreme Court as to the trial court's role as
gatekeeper when expert testimony is presented. Kumho has significant
implications for juvenile and family courts. As we have seen, with
respect to "traits evidence," the courts tend to consider the evidence of
psychological profiles and syndromes as new or novel (in a Frye
jurisdiction) or scientific knowledge requiring a Daubert analysis.
However, much of the evidence in children's cases can be described as
"general truth" or "particular truth," which many courts have found to
resemble the determination of credibility, which is within the
253. Gatowski, Asking, supra n. 238, at 443.
254. See Dobbin & Gatowski, supra n. 101, at 138 (urging that psychological
syndromes should not be divorced from their political contexts).
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understanding of lay jurors. To the extent that the state court considers
general truth or particular truth or, for that matter, traits evidence, to be
technical or other specialized knowledge, no reliability test at all would
be required, unless the court has adopted the Kumho decision (which
would trigger application of a Daubert analysis). Some states have
expressly rejected Kumho, which therefore limits the court's
gatekeeper role with respect to expert witnesses. Other states have
adopted Kumho, which brings these states in line with the federal
approach of the trial judge acting as a gatekeeper with all experts.
Other states may enact statutes consistent with the 2000 Amendment to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702,255 which incorporates Daubert and
Kumho. For states, which have not adopted Kumho, the question will
be whether to apply a reliability test, similar to that created in Daubert,
to non-scientific expert testimony. In states that have adopted Kumho,
the trial court judge, as gatekeeper, has the discretion to apply Daubert
factors or any other factors that are appropriate for the particular
expert. The standard of appellate review under Joiner and Kumho is
abuse of discretion, which means that the trial judge's determination of
reliability must withstand a determination of reasonableness by the
appellate court. This means that to find abuse of discretion, the
reviewing court must determine that the decision by the trial judge was
against the logic and effect of the circumstances before the court,
devoid of reason and essentially that no reasonable judge could have
come to the conclusion of the trial court. The appellate court may also
find abuse of discretion where the trial court misconstrues the law.
This deference to juvenile and family courts, often exercising their
parens patriae role, on determinations of the reliability of subjects of
expert testimony, suggests that doubts are to be resolved in favor of the
gatekeeper pursuant to Frye, Daubert, and Kumho.
255. The 2000 Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was enacted in response
to Daubert and Kumho. The Amendment provides that expert testimony is admissible
"[i]f (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case."
